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LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE INTERESTS IN
AMERICAN LABOR UNION WORKING
AGREEMENTS*
C. LAWRENCE CHRISTENSON**
PART I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
A world of rapidly changing technology almost inevitably
means the obsolescence of established rules of action. A grow-
ing conviction that this is true finds expression in the recently
adopted National Industrial Recovery Act. Whatever its final
effect, it is obvious that this measure is an attempt to redefine
the principles under which employment relations may arise in
terms thought to be more nearly harmonious with the current
industrial setting.
The coming of the N. R. A. adds renewed interest to the ques-
tion as to what has been the exact status of the standards estab-
lished by trade union action before American courts of law. A
re-examination of the decisions which have passed upon union
working agreements is therefore peculiarly appropriate at this
time.
* The writer wishes to acknowledge the benefit of many helpful sug-
gestions from Professors J. F. Christ, A. H. Kent, H. A. Millis, all of the
University of Chicago, Professor Hugh E. Willis of the Indiana University
Law School, and Mr. T. H. Long of the Chicago Bar.
** Department of Economics and Sociology, Indiana University.
1 Among earlier studies of this subject see: Ralph Fuchs, "Collective
Labor Agreements in American Law" (1924), 10 St. Louis Law Rev. 1;
Lindley Clark, "Legal Effect of Collective Agreements" (1912), 12 Month-
ly Labor Rev. 416, "Collective Bargaining in the United States of Amer-
ica" (1927), 15 International Labor Rev. 197; William G. Rice, "Collective
Labor Agreements in American Law" (1931), 44 Harvard Law Rev. 572.
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Warning should be issued against drawing any final conclu-
sions regarding what will be the judicial treatment of the stand-
ards established under the Recovery Act from the analysis here
presented. In accordance with Section 7, Subsection b, of the
N. I. R. A., trade union agreements when approved by the Pres-
ident will have the same effect as codes adopted under the Act.
Whatever final disposition the courts may make, it is clear
that rights and duties which may be recognized when trade
union agreements are approved by the President, are statutory.
Moreover, none of the language of the Recovery Act nor the
penalties accompanying violations of its provisions necessarily
impose any obligation upon the courts to recognize contractual
rights and duties in trade agreements. It is possible that this
new measure may become an influence tending to encourage
judicial recognition of contractual status in the trade agreement,
but this influence is likely to be subtle and difficult to trace. The
present undertaking is not concerned with conjecture as to what
the future court decisions may hold; rather it is concerned with
analysis of what the courts have actually done in litigations in-
volving alleged obligations arising out of trade union agreements
prior to the adoption of this new legislation. Against the back-
ground of such an analysis subsequent decisions which may re-
flect the effects of N. I. R. A. will be more easily understood and
their full significance will stand out in sharper relief.
As late as 1915 the Commission on Industrial Relations was
able to write:
It does not seem, nor has it been urged by any careful student
of the problem, whether employer or worker, that any good end
would be served by giving legal validity to joint agreements.2
More concrete evidence as to the attitude regarding the desir-
ability of legal enforcement of the trade union agreement is
found in the fact that a comprehensive abstracting service was
able to report that prior to 1913 only one case could be found in
which the question of the legal validity of the trade union agree-
ment had been squarely presented. 3 It is clear, therefore, that
whatever tendency there may be in the United States toward the
legal enforcement of collective labor agreements as contracts has
developed almost entirely within the last two decades.
2 Final Report (Washington, D. C., 1915), 193.
8 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184.
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An essential preliminary to an intelligent consideration of the
court decisions is an understanding of what the trade agreement
is in practice and what it seeks to accomplish. 4 The terms
"working", "trade", or "union" agreement as here used refer to
an understanding, evidence of which is usually in writing, be-
tween the officers of a labor organization acting for its member-
ship, and the representatives of an employer or of an employing
group, governing the terms of employment and working condi-
tions. There is usually an effort to create an agreement that is
much more comprehensive in its scope than the individual con-
tract of employment, although the trade agreement is normally
concerned with much the same subject matter.
The exact terms of the trade agreement will differ consider-
ably from one industry to another, but these differences will
nevertheless be found to lie within the boundaries of a definable
area. Thus, although it has been correctly stated that, "there is
scarcely a provision common to all agreements," yet it will al-
most inevitably be found that the trade agreement contains some
stipulation as to the rates of pay and the length of the working
day. 5 Generally the agreement makes some mention of the way
in which employees are to be represented, and frequently it calls
for the exclusive employment of union members, i. e., the "union
closed shop". On the other hand, the most commonly expressed
obligation of the union will be found in prohibition upon strikes
during the period of the agreement.
It will be noticed that the previous paragraphs make no men-
tion of a promise by the union to furnish the employer's labor
requirements for a definite period. Ordinarily no such promise
is made, but it is not difficult to find trade agreements which
either express or imply that the union is obliged to maintain an
employment exchange, and that the employer must obtain his
workers through the exchange. Finally, it should be mentioned
4 It is likely to be very misleading to approach a study of the legal
decisions without specific knowledge of the character of trade agreements
as they are actually made in the industry. Unfortunately, the reported
decisions rarely reproduce the agreements in litigation. For copies of
typical agreements see, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletins 393,
419, 448, and 468. For a recent analysis of agreements from a wide range
of industry see, C. L. Christenson, Collective Bargaining in Chicago:
1929-30 (The University of Chicago Press, 1933).
5 Perhaps the most important American trade agreement which must
be an exception even to this general statement is that of the Actors' Equity
Association. For details see, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 402.
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that agreements frequently embody some limitation on the em-
ployer's right to discharge his employees. While these state-
ments indicate the general character of trade agreements, it can-
not be emphasized too strongly that every agreement is a "made-
to-order" instrument and is likely to have features peculiar to
itself alone.
It will be well at this point to define more sharply the aims of
the present study. First, it makes no assumption regarding the
desirability of enforcing the trade agreement by legal means.
Moreover, it frankly doubts whether an answer to this problem
can be arrived at solely on the basis of a review of the legal
decisions. Its attention is directed mainly at the narrower ob-
jectives of: 1. a determination of what interests6 the law rec-
ognizes in these agreements; 2. an analysis of the principles
upon which these interests are recognized. The study will at-
tempt an entirely objective 7 investigation, and for the present,
no suggestions will be made as to what the law ought to be with
reference to the collective wage bargain.
In keeping with this purpose, much confusion will be avoided
by studiously refraining from speaking of the trade agreement
as a "contract"8 except in those cases where courts have seen fit
to recognize rights arising out of the union agreement.9 In
some cases it may be that in strictly legal terminology it is not
even justifiable to speak of the trade agreement.as a "bargain",
although the term "collective bargaining" has become such com-
mon usage with reference to union activity that it might be well
to designate "legal bargain" when it is used in its strictly tech-
nical sense. 10
6 The word "interest" as here used is a generic term to denote any con-
cernment or share whether or not it is legally recognized. When so rec-
ognized an interest becomes also a right, privilege, power or immunity.
Thus a right is a "legally protected interest." Cf. Encyclopedia of Social
Sciences, Vol. 8, p. 146, Col. 2.
. 7 For an excellent statement of the aims of the objective viewpoint in
social analysis see, F. H. Knight, 40 Jour. of Pol. Econ., pp. 433 ff.
8 The meaning adhered to will be: "A contract is a promise or a set
of promises for the breach of which the law grants a remedy, or the per-
formance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." A. L. I.
Restatement Law of Contracts (1932), Vol. 1, Sec. 1.
9 "Agreement has a wider meaning than contract, bargain, or promise.
The word contains no implication that legal consequences are or are not
produced. It applies to transactions executed on one or both sides, and
also those that are wholly executory." Ibid., Sec. 3.
10 "Bargain has a narrower meaning than agreement since it is appli-
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II. LEGAL INTERESTS AND BASES FoR THEIR RECOGNITION
Among the more prominent obstacles to the recognition of
enforceable interests under the trade union agreement is the
common law rule that the unincorporated association is not a
competent contracting party. In the absence of statutory pro-
visions to the contrary, it is ordinarily held that such associa-
tions cannot assume legal obligations or acquire rights.11 Since
most American trade unions have in the past remained unincor-
porated, 12 it follows that where the common law alone is appli-
cable, there are formidable obstacles which prevent the typical
American union from creating enforceable interests through the
making of trade agreements.
The manner in which the courts have met this situation has
varied with the specific character of the agreement in litigation
as well as with the particular interest which is in controversy.
Where the effort has been to establish separate workers' inter-
ests the most common treatment 13 has regarded the trade agree-
ment as a "usage" with reference to which the individual em-
ployers and employees might contract if they choose to do so.
Under this treatment the trade union working agreement creates
no legal rights or obligations so far as individual union members
are concerned. Legal interests arise only where individuals
adopt the terms of the trade agreement as a part of their con-
tracts of employment.
Despite an opposing view, which may better be examined after
a review of the decisions,' 4 a critical investigation indicates that
cable only to a particular class of agreements. A bargain is an agreement
of two or more persons to exchange promises or performances." Ibid.,
Sec. 4.
"1 St. Paul Typothetae v. Bookbinders (Minn. 1905), 102 N. W. 725;
West v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. (W. Va. 1927), 137 S. E. 654.
12 Investigation of the 148 labor unions of national significance listed
in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 506, indicated only fourteen as
incorporated in 1929. No such summary statement can be made for local
unions, but it is known that the incorporated local union is uncommon. Cf.
C. R. Daugherty, Labor Problems in American Industry (Houghton Mif-
flin Co., 1933), p. 395.
13 A careful classification of the cases reported down to August, 1933,
reveals that the statement, "The greater number of cases seem to base
their decision on the third party beneficiary theory" (18 Va. Law Rev. at
185), is and was at the time it was written (December, 1931) grossly
inaccurate.
14 See infra, note 52.
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there is no basis to conclude that these cases which illustrate the
"usage" doctrine have modified this general rule in recent years.
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co.15 appears to be the earliest case
in which an American supreme court was squarely confronted
with the problem of deciding as to the interest of individual
union members under a trade agreement. In that case Burnetta,
a member of the "Miners Union", 16 after working for the de-
fendant coal company about two months, requested on the next
pay day (June 16), which fell four days after he had voluntarily
left his employment, payment in full of all wages due him. On
that same day, after being refused full payment because the com-
pany declared that he was bound by the terms of a trade agree-
ment with the "Miners Union", which provided for semi-monthly
pay days and for the withholding of approximately two weeks
pay on every pay day,1' Burnetta brought suit to enforce imme-
diate payment. The company, although admitting the correct-
ness of the amount, denied that a part of it ($5.35) was due
until a subsequent pay day (June 30) and pleaded the trade
agreement as a defense. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of
Missouri sustained a judgment for the plaintiff and so held that
the trade union agreement did not govern the plaintiff's rights
in this case.
This conclusion was reached first on the ground that "the
Miners Union, as an organization, cannot (could not?) make a
contract in respect to performance of work and payment for
it."18 But since the defendant had not sought to establish the
contract by the contention that the union had such power, the
really significant basis for the court's decision was the answer
to the question as to whether the trade agreement had been
adopted as a part of the individual contract of employment. The
15 (Mo. 1904) 79 S. W. 136; 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 187.
16 Probably the United Mine Workers, but this fact is not definitely
established in the report.
17 No part of the agreement is given verbatim in the decision, and ex-
tensive search through trade union literature has failed to disclose an
agreement which could with certainty be identified as the one in this case.
18 Here the court was simply following the general rule applicable to
agreements made by voluntary unincorporated associations. On this point
the only case cited was Richmond v. Judy (1879), 6 Mo. App. 465, which
involved the liability of members of a political club on agreements made
for the club by its officers. The court stated its conclusion generally and
did not consider whether there might have been an actual agency by the
union in some particular cases.
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company pleaded that the workman had adopted the terms of
the union agreement, but "the sole testimony upon which the
appellant (coal company) relied to establish its contention (was
that of the superintendent of the coal company." He had testi-
fied to the effect that when the plaintiff was hired he had given
an affirmative reply upon being questioned as to whether he
understood the rules. In view of: first, the bias of this testi-
mony; second, the short period of employment; third, the passive
role of the plaintiff, it is here submitted that the conclusion that
this affirmative answer did not constitute a contractual promise
is reasonable and is entirely consistent with the majority of sub-
sequent decisions where the interests of an individual work-
man'9 have been involved.
It is in point to emphasize a feature of the Burnetta case
which seems to have been repeatedly disregarded. It is the fact
that the plaintiff played an exceedingly passive role in the pro-
ceedings. This is accounted for when it is observed that the real
purpose of the case lay in the concern of the defendant coal
company in securing a decision as to the constitutionality of &
Missouri statute which limited mining companies in determining-
the manner by which miners were paid. It must have been &
source of great disappointment to the coal company when the
supreme court decided the case on grounds which made it un-
necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of this bit of social
legislation.
The difference between the decision of the Burnetta case and
the more modern decisions where the usage doctrine has been
applied is not so much in the holdings of law as in the facts..
In the later cases the courts are not confronted with the curious
spectacle of a coal mining company seeking in 1900 to enforce
the terms of a trade union agreement !20 What the Burnetta.
19 This view is at variance with that presented in 44 Harv. Law Rev..
at 584. The justification for the present position will become clearer as
subsequent cases are discussed.
20 Anyone familiar with the history of the United Mine Workers must
know that this was but three years after the first important successes of
the union. The years subsequent to 1900 constituted the period when John
Mitchell was pleading for the respectful observance of union agreements,
but his plea was for "moral" rather than "legal" responsibility, and he was
unwilling to support the corollary of legal enforcement, namely, incorpora-
tion of trade unions. See his Organized Labor (American Book and Bible
House, 1903), particularly chapters 26 and 39. For indication that there
were real doubts among the bituminous miners in 1902 as to whether the-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
case really stands for is the simple proposition that a court will
not enforce the terms of a union agreement which limits the
employee's right to collect wages upon termination of his em-
ployment, unless there is more evidence than the testimony of
his employer that the agreement has been adopted as an indi-
vidual contract of employment. No subsequent case has been
found which can fairly be said to have reversed this specific
rule.21
The Burnetta case was followed three years later by Keysaw
v Dotterweich Brewing Company,22 in which the plaintiff, a
union workman, sought to recover pay in accordance with a
union agreement for overtime work done during two years while
in the employ of the defendant. He was granted a judgment ac-
cording to the trade agreement, not however because rights
automatically inured to him as a member of the union, but rather
because, "the defendant recognized the fact that the plaintiff
was working for it under the terms of this contract (i. e., union
agreement), the parties thus adopting the contract made in form
with the plaintiff's union." Furthermore, "the contract made
between the parties (i. e., employer and worker) was evidenced,
not only by the two writings made between the defendant and
the local union, but included what took place between the plain-
tiff and the defendant in adopting and supplementing the
same."
2 3
Langmade v. Olean Brewing Company,2 4 decided by the same
court in 1910, merely stated a corollary to the Keysaw case. It
held that if the employee chose to make an individual agreement
that departed from union standards, he could not recover upon
the union agreement even though he had earlier subscribed to
the trade agreement. The Burnetta case enunciated the prin-
ciple that if an employee does not adopt the terms of a trade
agreement in an individual contract of employment, then he
acquires no rights or duties under the union agreement. Key-
saw v. Brewing Company makes explicit the converse proposi-
agreements should even be treated as morally binding, see M. D. Savage,
Industrial Unionism in America (Ronald Press, 1922), pp. 83-4.
21 The case which most closely resembles Burnetta v. Marceline Coal
Co. is The Henry S. Grove (D. C. Md. 1927), 22 Fed. (2nd) 444, but the
possibility of fraud in the latter case prevents one from concluding with
certainty that the decisions are strictly in accord.
22 (App. Div. 1907) 105 N. Y. Supp. 562.
23 105 N. Y. Supp. at 564,
24 (App. Div. 1910) 121 N. Y. Supp. 388.
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tion, while the Langmade case adds the logical corollary that
individual agreements contrary to the union terms will prevent
successful suits by workers upon the trade agreement. With
these three cases the structure of what may be called the "adop-
tion of usage" theory for the recognition of individual interests
arising out of the trade agreement, is complete. Subsequent
cases amplify and supplement this doctrine, but they do not
change its basic structure. Except for the cases decided on prin-
ciples of agency or third party beneficiary, which stand on an
entirely different footing, only one case has been found which
may with any certainty be regarded as in conflict with the three
cases discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
Although the "adoption of usage" theory was complete with
the Langmade case, it remained for the court in Hudson v. Cin-
cinnati etc. Ry.25 to summarize the doctrine. This summary is
really only dictum so far as the Hudson decision itself is con-.
cerned.26 but so frequently has it been referred to that it merits
detailed paraphrasing here. The substance of the court's re-
marks on this matter is that, if an employee during the period
of the operation of a trade agreement enters the service of an
employer knowing of and assenting to the provisions of the trade
agreement, or if the agreement was so generally known among
that class of workers as to justify the presumption that he did
know of its terms, and if then he made no express contract in
conflict with any of its provisions, then (and then only?) the
trade agreement enters into and becomes a part of the individ-
ual employment contract as if fully incorporated therein.2 7
In the light of this language the Burnetta decision may be re-
considered against its factual setting. That case arose at a time
(1900) when the trade agreement in the coal industry was still a
novelty. The employee in the case had worked for the coal com-
pany only two months. Finally, the only evidence submitted that
he knew of the agreement and assented to its terms was the tes-
timony of the official of the employing company which was seek-
ing to enforce the agreement to the disadvantage of the em-
ployee. It is suggested that in view of these facts the court in
2c (Ky. 1913) 154 S. W. 47.
26 It is reasonably certain that even if the employee did have rights
arising out of the adoption of the trade agreement, in this case he had no
cause of action because the terms had been complied with.
27 This statement merely translates the language of the decision in
general terms. See 154 S. W. at 50.
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the Hudson case could consistently have written the decision of
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Company.
The cases thus far discussed are all of a pre-war vintage.
However, examination of more recent decisions reveals that the
doctrine that the trade agreement is a mere usage and by itself
creates no legal rights in individual workers, unless adopted by
them as a part of contracts of employment, continues to claim
modern support.
In St. Louis & B. P. M. Ry. v. Booker,28 a case which twice
reached the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, the plaintiff, a mem-
ber of an unincorporated railway union, obtained a judgment on
his claim for wages lost prior to his reinstatement in accordance
with the terms of a trade agreement. It should be observed,
however, that at no time during the proceedings at either trials
did the defendant railway company deny that the terms of the
trade agreement had been incorporated into Booker's contract
of employment; moreover, both the company and the plaintiff
from the very beginning of the circumstances leading to the dis-
pute acted as if they had adopted the terms of the trade agree-
ment.29 Hence, insofar as there is any expressed theory upon
28 (1926) 287 S. W. 130, (1928) 5 S. W. 2nd) 856, Certiorari denied
(1926) 117 Tex. 611, Certiorari denied (1929), 279 U. S. 852.
29 N. B. the following sequence of events:
1. November 30, 1920. P. discharged without trial.
2. December 16, 1920. At request of P. company held regular inves-
tigation, and although discharge held to be justified, company then by its
own admission "paid Mr. Booker ($116) for all time lost between the time
pulled out of service and the investigation held, thereby complying strictly
with Rule 37 of the national agreement." (See 287 S. W. at 132.)
3. At request of union representative, company permits appeal to
Railroad Labor Board.
4. November 19, 1921. Labor Board orders reinstatement with pay for
all time lost.
5. December 9, 1921. P. reinstated. Company official notifies P. by
letter of award of Labor Board and requests him to file accurate statement
of amount due him.
6. Statement filed, but company refused payment.
It would be difficult to find a case with stronger evidence that the trade
agreement had been adopted as the employment contract. Just why the
company refused to make payment after going so far in recognizing the
employee's rights is not clear, but one may hazard a conjecture that re-
fusal may have been connected with the fact that plaintiff participated in
"an illegal shop crafts strike" shortly after his reinstatement. (See, 287
S. W. at 131.) The strike referred to could hardly have been the "shop-
men's strike" as this did not officially begin until July 1, 1922. However,
from early in 1921 there was restlessness among the railroad shop mechan-
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which to base the plaintiff's claims, the language has the flavor
of estoppel. Thus the second appeal decision reads:
All of the proceedings and actions taken by the appellant with
reference to appellee's complaint . . . were had under the pro-
visions of rules 36 and 38 . . . which were recognized by appel-
lant as an existing part of the appellee's contract of employ-
ment.30
In view of the clear evidence pointing toward adoption in this
case, it can scarcely be contended that the language of the de-
cision goes any further in recognizing individual workers' in-
terests under the trade agreement than did the holdings in the
Burnetta or in the Hudson case. Careful analysis of two more
recent Texas cases,31 which involved questions and facts very
similar to those in the Booker case strengthens this conclusion.
But if there remains doubt as to whether the decision in St.
Louis B. M. Ry. v. Booker really did support the law of Burnetta
v. Marcelline Coal Co., that doubt is finally removed by the de-
cision of the still more recent case of Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co.
v. Wilson.32 Here the employee, Wilson, sued the railway com-
pany for wages lost during the period between his discharge and
reinstatement. The court concluded that even though the em-
ployee was originally working under the terms of a trade agree-
ics, and the plaintiff may have been active in this preliminary agitation.
See H. D. Wolf, The Railroad Labor Board (University of Chicago Press,
1927), pp. 232 and 238.
30 5 S. W. (2nd) at 858.
31 San Antonio A. P. Ry. Co. v. Collins (Civ. App. Tex. 1930), rehear-
ing denied 1931, 35 S. W. (2nd) 507. Approved with minor modifications
(Tex. Sp. Ct. 1933), 61 S. W. (2nd) 84.
Galveston H. S. A. Ry. Co. v. Eubanks (Civ. App. Tex. 1931, rehearing
denied 1931), 42 S. W. (2nd) 475. (Approved by Tex. Sp. Ct. 1933), 59
S. W. (2nd) 825.
The facts and holding of both of these cases are almost identical with
those of the Booker case. In the San Antonio case the findings of fact of
the trial judge contain the following significant statement: "The contract
of October 15, 1920, executed by the defendant and a representative of its
yardmen was in writing and was for the benefit and on behalf of all the
employees of the defendant in yard service, and the contract was accepted
by the plaintiff and other employees and was observed by them, and was
likewise accepted by the defendant and observed by it, and copies of the
contract were furnished each of the employees." 35 S. W. (2nd) at 508.,
Note plaintiff was not a member of the union which negotiated the agree-
ment.
32 (Civ. App. Tex. 1932) 55 S. W. (2nd) 216.
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ment, he had no good cause of action because his discharge had
been in accord with its terms. However, the court was explicit
in its declaration that even if there had been a breach by the em-
ployer the worker could not claim rights under the trade agree-
ment unless he had adopted its terms as his own. The decision
then proceeds,
While there is no direct testimony showing that Wilson as an
individual ever assented to the contract (sic) made between the
railway company and the employees' association, (unidentified)
the case was decided upon that assumption (that he did so as-
sent) in the lower court and is decided upon the same theory in
this court.33
After disposing of another element of the case which calls for
no attention here,34 the court then restated with approval the
general rule which it considered defined employees' interests un-
der trade agreements in almost the identical language of the
Burnetta case. This general rule
. . . is that individual members of a labor union are not bound
by contracts (sic) between the union and the employers unless
such agreements are ratified by the members of the union as in-
dividuals, and that in the absence of evidence of such ratifica-
tion by a member, no rights accrue to him which he can enforce
against his employer.3 5
Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault3 6 has been cited as a case
which illustrates that "the American doctrine annexes the rules
of the (trade) agreement to the individual employment contract
as a matter of law requiring no express adoption."37  If it is
assumed for the moment that there really is such an "American
33 55 S. W. (2nd) at 219.
34 This point involved the question as to whether the original union
agreement, which the court assumed had been adopted by Wilson, had
granted authority to union officials to negotiate for reinstatement of the
plaintiff on terms which would have improved his seniority standing in
return for a waiver of his claim to wages lost. 55 S. W. (2nd) at 218.
35 55 S. W. (2nd) at 219. Note that here, as on other occasions, the
court uses the term "ratification." "Adoption" is a better term since in
none of these cases is there any other suggestion of agency.
36 (Tenn. 1928) 9 S. W. (2nd) 692.
37 26 Ill. Law Rev. 922.
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doctrine" there is still some doubt regarding the use of this case
as an apt illustration of it. Here, the workman who sued the
coal company for breach of the terms of the trade agreement was
an official of the. union, and the agreement "was made by the
plaintiff with the defendant through. himself and agents." To
be sure, it is true that the court said,
We think the legal effect of the agreement (N. B., this par-
ticular agreement) between the operators and miners is that it
became a part of and formed the basis of each contract of em-
ployment between each operator accepting it and each of his
employees, who entered or continued in the service and employ-
ment of such employer with knowledge of its execution, and in
the absence of any express contract between the individual em-
ployee and his employer inconsistent with the terms of the
agreement. 38
This is the language of the Hudson case and like it is little
more than a dictum. It certainly was superfluous so far as the
establishment of the plaintiffs rights was concerned, for the coal
company had waived all objections to the admission of a copy
of the trade agreement as evidence, and the court went on to say,
"Without referring to the evidence in detail, we think it clearly
established that the employees of the coal company, including
Ault, considered that they were working under this agreement
as their contract of employment." 39 Whatever may be said of
the "American doctrine", so far as the Cross Mountain Coal case
is concerned it seems fairly clear that the terms of the trade
agreement had been adopted by the employees. Certainly the
plaintiff had adopted its terms as he was one of the officials who
negotiated the agreement!
Gary v. Central of Ga. Ry.40 was a case where in spite of the
unincorporated character of the union involved, it was easy for
the court to sustain individual rights under a trade agreement
because the terms of the agreement had been incorporated textu-
ally into the individual employment contracts. In the most re-
cent appeal of this case, the court clarified the theory upon which
it had acted by stating,
38 9 S. W. (2nd) at 694.
39 Ibid., at 694.
40 (Ga. 1928) 141 S. E. 819; (1929) 149 S. E. 309; (1931) 160 S. E.
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The plaintiff's suit was predicated absolutely upon the theory
that the rules and regulations of the brotherhood were embodied
in his contract of employment.* * * Be it said in this connec-
tion that this court did not hold, and did not intend to hold, in
its original decision that the brotherhood had authority to enter
into a contract with the defendant in behalf of the plaintiff
member. The question was not involved since the petition al-
leged, in effect, that the plaintiff himself, either directly or by
ratification, made a contract with the defendant containing the
rules and regulations of the brotherhood, as agreed to by its offi-
cers and the officers of the defendant company.
4 1
A Federal case, United States Daily v. Nichols, 42 appears to go
a bit further in permitting rights and duties to accrue to indi-
viduals under the trade agreement without adoption. Upon scru-
tiny, however, it is doubtful whether even this case modifies the
rule developed in these earlier decisions. In the Nichols case
the plaintiff workman sued the publishing company for back pay
which he claimed was due him under the union agreement. The
significant feature of the agreement provided that at specified
times upon notice by either the union or the employers' associa-
tion the wage scale might be changed. While negotiations on the
new rate were in progress, the scale was declared "open." The
"open" scale meant that the old rate was observed tentatively
with the understanding that when agreement was reached, the
new scale would be retroactive to the date of the termination of
the old agreement.
The defendant publishing company began business during a
period when the scale was "open" and although it was not a
member of the employers' association which negotiated agree-
ments with the union, it applied to the union for labor and ob-
served the old tentative union scale. The new union wage, fixed
by agreement through arbitration, was somewhat above the old
rate, and when the award was announced, the defendant refused
to supplement the wages paid for work already performed. The
court of appeals affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff allowing
back pay in accordance with the union agreement.
1
41 (Ga. 1913) 160 S. E. at 718. Note the court cites on this point Hud-
son v. Cincinnati (Ky. 1913), 154 S. W. 47; Piercy v. Louisville (Ky.
1923), 248 S. W. 1042; Snow v. Chadwick (Mass. 1917), 116 N. E. 801.
42 (Ct. App. D. C. 1929) 32 Fed. (2nd) 834.
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Although some of the language of the decision would seem to
indicate that the court would have held the employer and his
workers bound by the union terms whether or not they had actu-
ally adopted such terms as a part of employment contracts, this
language loses much of its significance when it is noticed that it
is not essential to the conclusion of the case. The facts of the
case revealed that the practice of regarding wage scales, agreed
upon after an "open" period as retroactive, had been observed by
all employers in the city of Washington for over fifty years; that
union members were not permitted to work for less than the
union scale; that the officials of the defendant were newspaper
men of long* experience and were thoroughly familiar with the
practices in union shops; and finally, most significant of all, that
the publishing company engaged a union foreman who proceeded
to recruit compositors from the union ranks through the office
of the union4 3 and observed the tentative "open" union scale.
Therefore, while it is true that the court refers to the retroactive
feature of the new scale as a "custom so old, notorious, definite
and uniform as to be binding on those within its purview," the
decision continues, "one (a custom) admittedly known to the
plaintiff in error and with reference to which the plaintiff in
error contracted." 44
Another recent federal case, Kessel v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 45 not yet (September, 1933) carried beyond a district court,
is of considerable significance because it represents one of the
few cases in which an employer, sued for an alleged breach of
contract, actually denies that a trade agreement creates any
right of action vested in an individual union employee. It is un-
fortunate that in a case in which the issues are so clearly drawn,
the reported decision contains but a very meagre statement of
facts. All that may be said with certainty is that the plaintiff
43 The statement in 44 Harv. Law Rev. at 589 to the effect that "The
defendant was not a member of the publishers association and had no
dealings with the union" apparently overlooks the important fact that the
defendant's foreman "advised the secretary of the local union that he was
about to open a union newspaper shop in this city, and left word with him,
the secretary, that he wanted union men." It seems certain, therefore,
that even though the defendant was not a member of the publisher's asso-
ciation, he had substantially the same kind of direct dealings with the union
as any of the other publishers.
44 32 Fed. (2nd) at 837.
45 (D. C. Wash. 1931) 51 Fed. (2nd) 304.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
workman sued his employer for an alleged violation of a clause
in a trade union agreement which provided that there would be
no discharge without trial. The court in passing upon the case
denied that the plaintiff had established his claim to damages,
saying,
No right of action accrued to the plaintiff by reason of the
employment unless predicated upon contract or tort. The action
is on contract and there is no allegation that the agreement was
by reason of any stipulation incorporated with the service so as
to entitle either party to enforce inter se the terms thereof.46
Although the court cites only a recent Canadian case,47 it
would seem (on the basis of the very scanty facts) that the
Kessel decision is squarely in line with many American prece-
dents.48
46 51 Fed. (2nd) at 305.
47 Young v. Canadian Northern Ry. (1930), 3 D. L. R. 352.
48 This decision has been adversely criticized in 18 Va. L. Rev. 187, as
follows: "The decision as it stands is a dangerous retrogression which may
overthrow years of constructive development. That is not the spirit of our
law. Should the courts follow this it will threaten destruction to a begin-
ning of what has seemed to be a new and satisfactory era in the relations
between employers and employees. Tear away the aid of the courts from
the collective agreements, and we will return to the days of widespread
strikes, boycotts, and acts of violence, by which employees who have no
other means of procuring fair wages, fair hours and good working condi-
tions, seek to equalize their bargaining power with that of their employer."
This, it is here submitted, is sheer romancing. The conclusion is based
upon the following assumptions, all of which contain a large measure of
error:
a. That recent legal precedents do not support the Kessel decision.
b. That what "seemed to be a new and satisfactory era" in industrial
relations was due to the spread of collective bargaining. (Compare union
membership of 1920 with that of 1930!)
c. That there has been a decided retreat from violence in labor rela-
tions. (See Louis Adamic, Dynamite (Viking Press, 1931). Also, E. E.
Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes (McGraw Hill Book Co., 1932),
Chapters VI and IX.)
d. That if strikes and boycotts have abated it has been because courts
have recognized rights of union members as accruing under the trade
agreement. (But note the retreat of unionism to sections of industry where
for peculiar economic reasons, employers are willing to support, or at least
tolerate collective bargaining. See Christenson, op. cit., especially pp.
882, if.)
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The only case found4 9 which clearly breaks this series of prece-
dents is Mastell v. Salo.50 Here, the plaintiff, Salo, a member
of the United Mine Workers, had been employed by the defend-
ant, an independent mine operator who had an agreement with
the union. The agreement provided that in addition to the regu-
lar tonnage rates, miners whose working space was converted
into entries through which to haul coal mined by other miners
were to receive a yardage payment to compensate for the re-
moval of dirt and rock from the space. After the plaintiff had
been employed for some time, his employer decided to convert
his working space into an entry. A short while thereafter it
was brought to the attention of local union officials by some of
the plaintiff's fellow workers that the plaintiff had received no
"yardage" payment. It appeared that Salo did not know that
the union agreement called for "yardage." Acting on his behalf,
the union officials made a request for payment of "yardage,"
and when this was refused, agreed to submit the matter to arbi-
tration. The arbitrator, a national officer of the union, ruled
that Salo was entitled to payment for "yardage." When the op-
erator still refused payment, this suit was brought. The re-
ported decision of the Supreme Court is on an appeal from a.
judgment for the plaintiff.
From the standpoint of determining the legal rights of em-
ployees under trade agreements, the significance of the Mastell
decision is blurred because of the possibility that the plaintiff
might have recovered simply because he had ratified the acts of
the union officials who negotiated for him during the arbitration
proceedings, regardless of the terms of the original trade agree-
ment. In spite of this possibility, however, it is clear that the
case goes much further toward recognizing interests of union
members as arising directly out of the working agreement than
any other case yet reviewed.
There was testimony showing that for a long period Salo re-
ceived semi-monthly statements of the amount due him for his
work, that none of these statements included "yardage," and that
Salo had been paid according to these and did not protest their
correctness. On the basis of this testimony the defendant asked
for an instruction to the jury to the effect that "if they so found
t
49 Except for the "third party beneficiary" and the "agency" cases,.
which stand on entirely different ground and which will be discussed later.
See infra pp. 87, ff.
vo (Ark. 1919) 215 S. W. (2nd) 583.
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the failure to object to the accounts ...would be regarded as
an admission of their correctness." Although judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed on another ground, on this crucial matter
the appeal sustained the lower court in its refusal to give the
instruction asked for, saying,
* * * (the plaintiff) did not know that he was entitled to yard-
age until his attention was called to that fact by the pit commit-
tee, whereupon he then claimed it * * * and the instruction
was properly refused because it took no account of the issue
that the appellee did not know when he received these state-
ments that he was entitled to yardage. 51
Here is a decision which does definitely break with the past. The
plaintiff is entitled to a payment, called for by a provision of a
trade agreement, of which provision on his own admission he
was ignorant, and with reference to which he could not possibly
have personally contracted.
Save for the Mastell case, from Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co.
to Kessel v. Great Northern Ry. the cases reviewed present an
unbroken line of adherence to the rule that the trade agreement
is a mere usage, creating no legal rights in the union members of
employers who may observe it, unless its terms are adopted as a
part of individual contracts of employment. The facts of the
cases vary, but the law concerning individual employees interest
under trade agreements of 1900 appears to be the law of 1933.52
51 215 S. W. at 584.
52 It will be noticed that this statement is sharply at variance with the
ilrst of the three main conclusions of Professor Rice, which reads:
From this review of the cases one may conclude with assurance that,
1. A collective employment agreement establishes a rule which, unless
negatived, is a term of every employment relation established between any
employer and any worker when each is a member of some organization
which negotiated it, and perhaps when either the employer or the worker
is so included; that it is a usage or, since knowledge of it is probably not
necessary, a custom. 44 Harv. Law Rev. at 604.
If this means that a union member requires legally enforceable interests
under a trade agreement when he accepts employment with a union shop,
without any further evidence of adoption of the terms of the trade agree-
ment, the "usage" cases discussed by Rice do not lend strong support to the
conclusion.
The Burnetta case is admittedly out of line and regarded by Rice as
"a fit contemporary for Lpckner v. New York" The Hudson case he
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In all but one of the cases treated in the preceding section in
which individual interests have been sustained, it has been shown
that there has been evidence to justify the conclusion that the
terms of the agreement were adopted by the employer and his
workers as part of individual contracts of employment. But
there are at least two other series of cases which stand on differ-
ent grounds. The first of these consists of a group of cases in
which the courts have regarded the union or its officials as
authorized agents of the individual workers. A real difficulty
in the application of agency principles is that ordinarily a trade
agreement by itself does not create even the form of a complete
contractual relationship between members of the union and any
individual employer. Even with a trade agreement in force,
the individual employment contract is ordinarily at will,53 and
it is only after performance by the employee that a unilateral
contractual obligation arises.54
regards as uttering only a dictum since the trade agreement had been
complied with. If Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. was a "usage" case, there
certainly was some evidence of adoption since the plaintiff had protested
against modification long before he brought suit to protect his interests.
See infra., note 66. Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry. (Mich., 1922), 191
N. W. 210, holds merely that if the individual employee had acquired
rights he could not enforce them by injunction. Conductors v. Jones (Col.
1925), 239 Pac. 882, was admittedly not clear, and West v. Baltimore &
Ohio (W. Va. 1927), 137 S. E. 654, rejected the plaintiff's claim as "he was
not shown to be within the collective agreement."
In the remaining four "usage" cases discussed by Rice individual inter-
ests were recognized, but there was ample evidence of adoption in each
case (see supra pp. 76-83). The strongest case found which may support
Rice's conclusion, Mastell v. Salo, he relegates to a footnote with only
passing mention. Accuracy requires a return to the language of Fuchs,
who, in spite of incomplete analysis of Mastell v. Salo, concluded his review
of the early usage cases thus:
It is clear that in all the foregoing cases, the collective labor agreements
* * * were legal nullities. Of themselves they bound no one. In certain
cases, however, where the facts warranted such a conclusion, they were
vitalized as to certain terms by being expressly or impliedly incorporated
into contracts to which the courts would give effect. (10 St. Louis Law
Rev. at 5.)
Rice also appears to be responsible for the view expressed in Witte, op. cit.
pp. 14-15.
53 See Hudson v. Cincinnati.
54 Professor Christ's extensive researches have disclosed a case which
may be interpreted as holding that part performance by the employee
creates bilateral contract. See J. F. Christ, "Federal Courts and Organ-
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However, even where this is true, it does not absolutely pre-
vent the recognition of workers' interests on the theory of
agency. The fact that trade unions or union officials are not
ordinarily vested with authority to make unconditional promises
on behalf of union members does not mean that authority is also
lacking to make conditional promises. The union officials may
be given authority to promise that if any member of their organ-
ization accepts employment with any employer signing a trade
agreement, he will do so on the union terms. In that event it
may be said that the effect of the trade agreement is to define the
employer's offer. The acceptance necessary to create contractual
rights does not finally occur until some member of the union
actually begins work. Once this has been done, unless the em-
ployer has repudiated the trade agreement in the meantime
(which he may lawfully do, then contractual obligations might
be defined by the union agreement.
Although not at once apparent, the use of this reasoning,
where the facts permit, may give quite a different character to
individual interests in union agreements then would be devel-
oped on an interpretation in terms of adoption of usage. If
the interests recognized are contractual ones, then it would seem
reasonable that individuals could hardly be supposed to have
adopted provisions of which they had no knowledge 55 unless the
provisions have been so long and commonly observed in the trade
that it is fair to presume 56 them to be adopted if not specifically
rejected. On the other hand there seems to be nothing in the
principles of freedom of contract which is repugnant to permit-
ting individual workmen to authorize officials chosen by them
through more or less democratic machinery to make the kind of
conditional promises suggested. Where such authority existed
it would seem consistent 57 with the principles of contracts to
enforce provisions of trade agreements even when employees
might be ignorant of their specific nature.
The cases are not numerous, but circumstances have arisen in
which the courts have found the use of the agency theory appro-
priate. The clearest application of this doctrine occurs in a
series of New York cases where the individual interests of the
ized Labor." Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, April,
1930, p. 218.
55 As seems to be the case in Mastell v. Salo, see supra, pp. 22, if.
56As perhaps might have been done in U. S. Daily v. Nichols, but in
fact was not. Supra, pp. 18 ff.
57 Not necessarily desirable, of course.
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union members are treated collectively. Probably the most em-
phatic approval of the interpretation which regards the union
as a legal agent of its members occurs in Maisel v. Sigman.
Even though this case is important for its analysis of other
points as well, its espousal of the agency theory is none the less
clear. Concerning the trade agreement in litigation the court
declared that,
In substance * * * it is an agreement between employer and
employees, and every clause of the same undertakes to regulate
some phase of the relations between the parties as such employer
and employees. * * * The status of the union as such in connec-
tion with the agreement is primarily that of agent of the em-
ployees. 58
It is worthy of emphasis that this language was not couched
in general terms. It was drawn up with reference to the par-
ticular agreement of the International Ladies Garment Workers'
Union, which was in litigation. The decision grew out of a
natural interpretation of the intent of the parties as expressed
in the agreement itself, which indicated that it was entered into
"for and in behalf of the said union and for and in behalf of
the members thereof, now employed and hereafter to be em-
ployed by the employer, with the same force and effect as if
this agreement had been made between the said employer and
the said union and all individual members now or hereafter
employed by the said employer."o While it would be possible
to avoid the conclusion that the union was meant to be regarded
as an agent for its members (the agreement called for a union
closed shop), it is certainly reasonable to interpret this lan-
guage as indicating that members of the union authorized their
organization to act for them.30
In an earlier case, Schlesinger v. Quinto, the same jurisdiction
granted injunctive relief at the request of the officers of the
58 (Sp. Ct. N. Y. Cty. 1924) 205 N. Y. Supp. 807. Notice that the
power of railroad employees to make even an unincorporated union an
agent for them is now definitely established by Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of the Railway Labor Act of 1926. See Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v. Ry.
Clerks, (1930) 281 U. S. 548.
59 Ibid., at 820.
uo Although it is not possible to be certain of all the terms from the
reported decision, it is probable that this agreement was very similar to,
if not identical with, that reproduced almost in entirety in U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Bulletin 468, pp. 77 ff.
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I. L. G. W. Union, who asked for an order requiring the employ-
ers' association in the case to rescind a resolution by which it
was proposed to return to the practice of payment on a piece
work basis in contravention of the terms of the trade agreement.
For present purposes, it is important not to be misled to the con-
clusion that since the union officials brought suit they were act-
ing on behalf of the union as a party principal. Rather it would
seem that the action of the union officers was the formal means
by which they sought to protect the individual interests of all
the union members in a single suit. This at least seems to have
been the treatment accorded by the court when in comparing the
action with that in the Hitchman case61 it said,
The only distinguishing feature in the instant case is that the
applicants are workers. * * * It cannot be seriously contended
that the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. * * * There
are over 40,000 workers whose rights are involved, and over
three hundred members of the defendant organization.62
When the injunction was sustained by the Appellate Division,
the statement that "the resolution * * * required under the
penalty provided in the by-laws of the (employers') association,
that the employers break their agreements with their em-
ployees," 63 indicated a similar interpretation of the rights in-
volved.
Moreover, even though the point seems to have been only
hastily considered, there is little room for doubt as to the man-
ner in which the "rights" of these 40,000 workers had been
acquired. In its summary of the facts, the Appellate Division
states, "The union and the association made collective agree-
ments with each other, with the authorization and on behalf of
their respective members." 64  Later in the opinion, whatever
doubt remains on the matter of whether the court actually meant
to infer that a principal-agent relation existed is swept away
by the observation,
61 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell (1917), 245 U. S. 229, in
which officials of the United Mine Workers were enjoined from carrying
on organization activities which interfered with individually made con-
tracts of employment.
62 (Sp. Ct. 1922) 192 N. Y. Supp. at 570.
63 (App. Div. 1922) 194 N. Y. Supp. at 409.
64 194 N. Y. Supp. at 403.
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Two organizations, one composed of employers and the other
of employees, have entered into an agreement. Each had power
through the consent of the members to enter into a binding
obligation in their behalf.
65
In view of the fact that the Schlesinger case and Maisel v.
Sigman in all probability were concerned with identical agree-
ments, and were decided in the same jurisdiction, is it not per-
missible to regard them as complementing each other and estab-
lishing beyond doubt a willingness of New York courts to recog-
nize individual interests arising out of a trade agreement on
agency principles where facts permit the interpretation that an
association has the authority to act for its membership? Sub-
sequent decisions from New York certainly encourage an affirm-
ative answer.60
To the courts of New York also must go the credit for intro-
ducing the use of the third party beneficiary doctrine in the trade
union agreement cases. The earliest application found is in the
65 Ibid., at 410.
66 See Goldman v. Cohen (App. Div. 1928) 227 N. Y. Supp. 311 and
Ribner v. Racso Butter & Egg Co. (Sp. Ct. 1929), 238 N. Y. Supp. 132.
It should be emphasized that in both these cases the court was mainly con-
cerned with the interest of the union as a party principal, but there is
evidence that it was also regarded as agent for the membership as well.
Also see Meltzer v. Kaminer (Sup. 1927), 227 N. Y. Supp., where at 461
the court says, "It is not unreasonable, therefore, that the local, which rep-
resented as agent each of its members, be restrained from calling the strike
in violation of the written agreement."
Barnes v. Berry (C. C. A. 1909), 169 Fed. 225, and Fell v. Berry (1908),
108 N. Y. Supp. 669, were early cases decided on agency principles holding
that in the particular circumstances the union officials had exceeded their
authority. Aside from the New York cases the only ones found in which
it seems reasonable to assume that the court adopted an agency interpreta-
tion are Aden v. Louisville N. R. Co. (Ky. 1921), 276 S. W. 511, holding
that an employee having authorized union officials to negotiate for him
cannot have injunction against operation of a trade agreement, and pos-
sibly Piercy v. Louisville N. R. Co. (Ky. 1923), 248 S. W. 1042, which the
writer interprets on the agency theory and as holding that a union mem-
ber may have injunction against modification of agreement where union
officers act outside authority. But compare this interpretation with that
by Rice, 44 Harv. Law Rev. at 595. In view of the fact that at least some
of the New York cases were known to Professor Rice, the writer is at a
loss in attempting to harmonize the conclusions here arrived at regarding
the use of the agency theory with Rice's statement (after discussing
Barnes v. Berry), "No other case has been found that deliberately adopts
an agency theory."
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case of Gulla v. Barton.67 Here, a workman in ignorance of the
exact terms of the working agreement of his union, upon discov-
ering that he had worked for some time at less than the union
scale, brought suit to recover the difference between the wages
paid him and the amount he would have received according to
the union rate. The theory upon which the court granted his
request was clearly indicated in the declaration:
We have therefore a situation where the plaintiff received
from week to week the wages contemplated by the contract of
employment between him and the defendant, and his union unbe-
known to him made a contract for his benefit based upon a
separate consideration passing from the union, that he as a
member thereof should receive a greater compensation. 68
Although a number of courts have followed the holding in
Gulla v. Barton, so far as can be determined from the reports,
they have all overlooked the significant fact of incorporation 69
of the union involved in that case, and extensive search has re-
vealed no other case decided on the third party beneficiary prin-
ciple which involved an agreement by an incorporated union.
A case which illustrates the use of both agency and third party
beneficiary principles is Blum v. Landau70 in which the plaintiff,
one Rose Landau, obtained a judgment for wages due under the
terms of a trade agreement made by the International Ladies
Garment Workers' Union with the Cleveland Garment Manufac-
turers' Association. Most of the opinion is given over to con-
sideration of the obligation of the defendant employer, and the
67 (App. Div. 1914) 149 N. Y. Supp. 952.
68 Ibid. at 953.
69 Possibly a mechanical error accounts for the statement, "The plaintiff,
a member of an unincorporated union, etc.," which appears in Rice, op.
cit. 44 Harv. Law Rev. at 596. Because of the importance of the point, the
exact language of Gulla v. Barton, which is certainly clear and unambig-
uous, may be quoted: "He (i. e., the plaintiff) brings this action * * *
basing his claim upon an agreement made between the defendant and the
Malsters' Union 48 * * * of which he was a member, and which was a
local subordinate branch of the International Union of the United Brewery
Workmen of America (name changed in 1918), the former being incor-
porated under the laws of the state of New York and the latter being incor-
porated under the laws of the state of Ohio. 149 N. Y. Supp. at 952-3. Cf.
Comment in 41 Yale Law Jour, at 1224, note 25, which recognizes fact of
incorporation in Gulla case.
70 (Ct. App. Ohio 1926) 155 N. E. 154.
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court held his duties under the trade agreement clearly estab-
lished because of: 1. An original agent and principal relation
between representatives of the employers' association and Blum
and Company ;71 2. Failure to give the required notice of desire
to terminate; and 3. Acquiescence even after modification of the
agreement.
While it is possible that the court might have held that the
plaintiff had acquired rights by adopting the terms of the trade
agreement,7 2 it is clear that its decision on this point is based on
other ground. The language, "The great weight of later de-
cisions is to the effect that where the name of the third party
does not appear to the contract, if the terms are made for the
benefit of such persons, the provisions of the contract are en-
forceable * * *" admits of only one interpretation.7 3 Although
it was known to the court that the union in the case was unin-
corporated, there is no indication that any consideration was
given to the question of how an association, presumably incompe-
tent to contract on its own behalf, could enter into a contract on
behalf of third parties.
Two recent contemporary cases74 have elicited approval of
enforcement of employee interests upon third party beneficiary
71 The agreement itself stated, "* * * this agreement is entered into
between the Cleveland Garment Manufacturers' Association on behalf of
those of its members whose signatures are attached hereto and the union."
72 While discussing the obligations of the defendant the court recog-
nized that "* * * under all cases involving a voluntary unincorporated
association, mere acquiescence is sufficient to make the contract valid and
to bind the members of the association thereto." 155 N. E. at 156. Notice
also that it is entirely possible that there might have been recovery in this
case without direct reliance on the trade agreement simply on ground of
quasi-contracts.
73 155 N. E. at 157. Although referring to "the great weight of later
decisions," the court cites only one case, Cleveland Ry. v. Heller (1921), 15
Ohio App. 346, holding that a citizen, injured because of damaged pave-
ment which defendant railway had contracted to keep in repair, has cause
of action against railway company.
74 Other possible third party beneficiary cases are Hall v. St. Louis &
San Francisco Ry. (Mo. 1930), 28 S. W. (2nd) 687 and David Adler &
Sons v. Maglio (Wis. 1929), 228 N. W. 123. Perhaps the early cases
Jacobs v. Cohen (Ct. App. 1905), 183 N. Y. 207, and Simers v. Halpern
(Sup. Ct. 1909), 114 N. Y. Supp. 163, may illustrate another variant in
the third party beneficiary group, if it is permissible to interpret them as
cases where the union was made a third party beneficiary in the event of
breach of the individual contracts of employment of union members.
In the Hall case an employee recovered damages for breach of dis-
charge clause, and the court used third party beneficiary language. It
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principles by courts of last resort. In one of these, Johnson v.
American Railway Express Company,75 a member of an unin-
corporated 76 union, discharged without trial as called for in the
union working agreement, brought suit for damages. The de-
fendant express company's motion for nonsuit, granted in the
lower court, was overruled upon appeal to the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The
basis upon which the court recognized the employee's rights in
the trade agreement is indicated by the numerous cases7 7 sus-
taining rights of third party beneficiaries, as well as by the lan-
guage, "* * * it is plain that if the contract be legal and valid
and secures a benefit to the members, each would be entitled to
enforce such benefit." In spite of the fact that the court clearly
recognized the plaintiff's right to sue on the agreement as a third
party beneficiary, however, the opinion continues,
No legal objection to the legality or validity of such an agree-
ment has been urged by the employer or has occurred to the
court. On the contrary, in the present case, it has been signed
by the employer, promulgated and acted upon by it; it must be
assumed that it was known to the employees and was an induce-
ment to them to enter or continue in the service, the employer
would be estopped to deny its binding force. 8
After this language it is a matter for wonderment why the court
feels impelled to repudiate the Hudson case and Burnetta v. Mar-
celine Coal Co.7 9
Yazoo M. V. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard8 is less ambiguous and
more daring. Sideboard, the plaintiff, had been employed by
would appear, however, that there was an individual employment contract
for three years, which although oral and therefore void, was not contested
and might have been acceptable as evidence of adoption.
In the Adler case individual interests were not the primary concern
and are not discussed in the reported appeal decision cited. But the
decision in the lower court, a manuscript of which has been made available
through the courtesy of Mr. William Quick, one of the attorneys in the
case, is in terms of third party beneficiary rights.
75 (S. C. 1931) 161 S. E. 473.
76 Fact not stated in opinion, but see U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bulletin 420, p. 74.
77 No less than fourteen cases are cited, but investigation shows that
not one of them involved a union working agreement. See 161 S. E. at 476.
78 161 S. E. at 476.
79 See supra, pp. 74 if.
80 (Sp. Ct. Miss. 1931) 133 So. 669.
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the defendant railway for eighteen years, during the last ten of
which the company had a working agreement with the Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen. Some relevant parts of the agree-
ment read: "Rights in this agreement shall be understood to
apply for both white and colored employees alike," and "* * *
road trainmen performing more than one class of road service
in a day or trip will be paid for the entire service at the highest
rate applicable to any class of service performed."8 1
The plaintiff, who because of color was ineligible for member-
ship in the Brotherhood, for fourteen years continuously per-
formed the joint duties of porter and brakeman, and during the
first seven years following the date the trade agreement went
into effect (June 1, 1918),82 he was paid the brakeman's scale in
accordance with the union agreement. Four years before his
discharge the company decided to pay him at a lower rate applic-
able to porter service. Although "appealing for a recognition
of * * * rights to brakeman's pay * * *" the plaintiff accepted
and cashed the checks offered at the lower rate, except during
his last year of employment with the company, when he refused
to do so and continued to work without receiving compensation.
He was discharged when the company "saw that there was no
probability of a change in attitude * * * in respect to this mat-
ter of pay." For the period during which he had worked with-
out compensation, the court recognized the plaintiff's right to
wages at the union brakeman's scale, but held that during the
previous three years he had waived his rights under the trade
agreement by accepting pay at a lower rate.
After citing the Hudson, Burnetta, and West cases the court
went on to say, "these rulings have been left in the rear in the
advancement of the law on this general subject, and the hold-
ings now are that these agreements are primarily for the indi-
vidual benefit of the members of the organization, and that the
rights secured by these contracts are the individual rights of
the individual members of the union, and may be enforced
directly by the individual."8 % But the cases which were cited 84
81 133 So. at 670.
82 Some of the terms of the union agreement were originally effective as
an order from the Director General of the Railroads during the period of
Federal control, but there is no question as to novation as it is clear that
the language of the order was incorporated in the agreement between the
union and the company.
83 133 So. 671.
84 Piercy v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky. 1923), 248 S. W. 1042; Gulla v.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to illustrate the "advancement of the law," it was recognized
did not go far enough to support the plaintiff's rights in this
case. After noticing "that a third party may recover on a con-
tract made expressly for his benefit," in Mississippi, the court
proceeded to show that even though the plaintiff was not a mem-
ber of the union, it was intended that he should be a beneficiary
under the agreement. This is the distinctive feature of the
Yazoo case; it provides the only decision found where a non-
unionist is permitted to acquire interests in a trade agreement
as a third party beneficiary.8 5
But the Yazoo decision must be interpreted squarely in the
light of the particular agreement involved. The court did not
say that a non-unionist would be permitted to recover on any
working agreement made by a union with his employer.86 It
was clear that since the agreement did not provide for the closed
shop, and since the union did not admit negroes, the provision
which called for equal treatment was inserted intentionally to
remove a possible cause for discrimination against union mem-
bers.
The cases where courts have recognized individual workers'
interests arising out of trade agreements on third party bene-
ficiary principles furnish an appropriate transition to a consider-
ation of the extent to which the union per se acquires legal rights
or duties under working agreements. It will be recalled that in
only one of these cases was there an incorporated union in-
Barton (1914), 149 N. Y. Supp. 952; Blum v. Landau (Ohio, 1926), 155
N. E. 154; Cross Mt. Coal Co. v. Ault (Tenn. 1928), 9 S. W. (2nd) 692.
The court overlooked the fact that the union was incorporated in the Gulla
case, and there is certainly ample ground for holding that in Piercy and
Cross Mt. cases there was either adoption by the individual or actual
agency. This leaves the Blum case as the only one really parallel to the
case at bar, and even it did not involve a suit on a union agreement by a
non-member.
85 But note Gregg v. Starks (Ky. 1920), 224 S. W. 459, permits non-
unionist to protect seniority rights defined in trade agreement, probably
because terms supposed to be incorporated in contract of employment.
86 As seems to be implied in the note in 26 Ill. Law Rev. at 922, which
concludes that the Yazoo decision "leads one to wonder whether organized
labor has entrapped itself. Will labor favor a result which gives the bene-
fits of its efforts to a non-union employee and indeed to members of a rival
organization." In point of fact "labor" (i. e., organized labor) probably
has less cause for concern when "the benefits of its efforts" do accrue to
non-unionists than when they do not. For example consider the economic
factors involved in Alco Zander v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers (D. C.
Penn. 1929), 35 Fed. (2nd) 203.
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volved, 87 and yet in none of them was there any discussion as
to the question of competency. Because of this fact it is hardly
warranted to conclude that this small number of cases, even in
the jurisdictions in which those cases were decided, definitely
establish that unions have come to be regarded as competent
contracting parties. Nevertheless, the decisions are there, and
they cannot be brushed aside merely as legal anomalies. The
fact remains that in these decisions labor unions were permitted
to act as competent parties, and therefore in these particular
cases were to all intents and purposes competent. The cases
might thus come to constitute steps in a movement to vest labor
unions with new attributes8 8 of legal personality without requir-
ing the formal act of incorporation.
The same significance cannot be attributed to the cases where
individual union members acquire rights because it is held that
the union (not the union officials, who are rather in these cases
agents of the union) has acted with authority from its member-
ship. While it will be seen that some of the agency cases do go
further in holding that the union is not merely an agent, com-
petency of the union to contract on its own behalf is not implied
from the fact that it is recognized as agent for its members.
An early case in which the union was recognized as having
the power to act as an agent for its members, and in the exer-
87 i. e., Gulla v. Barton, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952. If Hall v. S. F. Ry. 28
S. W. (2nd) 687, is interpreted as decided on third party beneficiary lines,
another exception might have to be made, although it is probable that even
here the union was unincorporated.
88 The rule that corporate responsibility may be attached even to unin-
corporated unions was clearly stated in New York as early as 1920 in
Micheals v. Hillman, 183 N. Y. Supp. 195, and by federal courts in the now
famous Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (1922), 259 U. S. 344,
(1925) 45 Sp. Ct. 555. Apparently the rule is gaining acceptance. See
Christian v. International Association (D. C. Ky. 1925), 7 Fed (2nd) 481;
Alden Bros. v. Dunn (Mass. 1928), 162 N. E. 775; Syz v. Milk Wagon
Drivers Ct. App. Mo. 1930), 24 S. W. (2nd) 1080. It should be strongly
emphasized that the rule of the Coronado case does not necessarily go so
far as to recognize competency, for competency is a power. The court there
held that because unions had been given some powers, they should also be
forced to accept corresponding responsibilities. If the power to contract
was not one granted by law apart from the Coronado case, that case does
not necessarily grant the additional power of competency merely because
it imposes a new corporate liability. The recognition of this power although
it may not be far distant, is a separate step. Cf. E. H. Warren, Corporate
Advantages Without Incorporation. (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1929) espe-
cially pp. 648, ff.
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cise of which, this power may have become "coupled with an
interest" is that of Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union.8 9
Strangely enough, the decision in this case was issued by the
same court 90 which one year later was to write the famous
decision of Hudson v. Cincinnati Ry. Co. In the Saulsberry case
the employer, who had been operating his cooperage factory
with union labor, found that the union would not renew its
agreement with him save at a higher wage rate than had been
granted by agreement to other union employers in his vicinity.
The officials had reclaimed the union stamp, and since there
was a union rule to the effect that members could work only in
an establishment supplied with the union stamp, this action
amounted to calling a strike. The plaintiff's petition requested
that the union be compelled, either to grant him the use of the
stamp, or to make an agreement with him on the same terms
as those granted to his competitors. From a judgment dis-
missing his petition the plaintiff appealed without success. 91
It will be noticed that there was no question of enforcement
of the trade agreement in the case since the agreement involved
had terminated. The sole question was whether a court would
compel a union to make a new trade agreement, but in deciding
that question the court made the significant observation,
The old contract has been made with the union. The union
alone was clothed with power to contract for its members, and
the contract, if made at all, had to be made by the union. Hence
the wish or will of individual members cannot be considered in
determining the rights of the parties to the controversy. If the
89 (Ky. 1912) 143 S. W. 1018.
90 There is some question as to how the Kentucky courts could acquire
jurisdiction as this union was treated as an entity and central offices of
both local and international were in Cincinnati, while the employer's busi-
ness was in Covington. Although the report does not so state, it is prob-
able that both unions were unincorporated. On this latter point see Hop-
kins v. Oxley Stave Co. (C. C. A. 1897), 83 Fed. 912.
91 Note that the holding is not necessarily in conflict with the contem-
porary case of Powers v. Journeyman Bricklayers Union (Tenn. 1914),
172 S. W. 284, where the union "assumed * * * the obligation to give
notice of terms" and where failure to give such notice resulted in con-
tractor paying more than the union scale. Such failure was regarded as
a "continuing misrepresentation" resulting in damage to the employer, for
which the union was liable but since it was unincorporated, the court held
its membership must be sued by the device of representative actions.
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union had a right through its representatives to contract, which
is not denied, then the desire of the individual members cannot
be taken into consideration at all, and it is immaterial whether
they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the proposed arrange-
ment.
It is remarkable that this is from the same court,9 2 even from
the same judge,93 who only twelve months later was to write,
A labor union as such engages in no business enterprise. It
does not and cannot, bind its members to a service for a definite,
or for any period of time, or even to accept the wages and regu-
lations which it might have induced an employer to adopt in the
conduct of his business. * * * Contracts between an individual
member of a union and an employer for personal service, being
merely incidental to the broad purposes of the union, its agents,
in action for the union, in no way bind the individual members
thereof.
While it is true that this is really dictum so far as the result in
the Hudson case is concerned, 95 nevertheless, this dictum has
been so influential in later cases that it is worthwhile analyzing
the contrast between this holding and the Saulsberry decision. 94 a
Suppose in the latter case that all the employees of the plaintiff
had been willing to work for the rate of 35 cents per hour, while
all the other members of the union voted to establish the scale of
40 cents per hour, and that the union officials succeeded in get-
ting all the union employers, except the plaintiff to agree to pay
the higher scale. Now, since the union has also by the majority
rule determined that no members can work in any shop not
supplied with the union stamp, it can, in accordance with the
Saulsberry decision, effectively deny members their power of
making individual employment contracts while they remain in
the union.
Here is personality; here through the principle of majority
rule the organization acts as a unit; the wills of individual mem-
bers do not matter; by agreement they have created a collective
will, which creation may appear to be an anomaly in language,
92 One of the seven members of the bench was new in 1913.
93 J. Lassing wrote the opinion in both the Hudson and Saulsberry cases.
94 See supra, p. 12, also Rice op. cit. p. 585.
95 See p. 100.
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but is in fact a reality. It does not follow, however, that the
results in these two cases are inconsistent merely because the
theory upon which they are decided appears to be. In the Hudson
case the individual union man who brought the suit alleged that
all those members of the union "who accepted employment under
the contract, undertook to work for a period of two years,"
merely because the trade agreement was to be effective for that
length of time. Now anyone at all familiar with trade union
practice knows that this is certainly not the intent of the parties
at the time a trade agreement is made. Neither the employers,
the union representatives, nor the individual workers who accept
employment in union shops ordinarily anticipate that the em-
ployment will be for the period of the trade agreement. Appar-
ently in the Hudson case the court was faced with a contention,
so far from the ordinary contemplation of collective bargaining,
that it felt under obligation to refute it, even though the refuta-
tion was irrelevant to a holding on the plaintiff's substantive
rights and even at the expense of generalizing too broadly.
But in the Saulsberry case the court was confronted with a
fait accompli. The union there actually had made an agreement
"by the terms of which the union was to furnish union labor
* * * for one year at the stipulated price of 35 cents per hour
for a day's work consisting of nine hours. The union supplied
(the) shop with a stamp * * * which was to be used on all
cooperage manufactured at (the) factory * * * (and) under
this agreement, the business was conducted during the life of
the contract." 96 It was in this situation that the court held that,
"If the union had a right, through its representatives to contract
(which was not denied), then the desire of the individual mem-
bers cannot be taken into consideration at all." 97 Which perhaps
demonstrates nothing more than that even the judicial mind
95 The language of the Burnetta decision which the court quotes with
approval in the Hudson case is still more pointed: "That the Miners union,
as an organization, cannot make a contract for its individual members in
respect to the performance of work and the payment for it, in our opinion
is too clear for discussion." 79 S. W. at 139. Evidently the court had not
discovered the Burnetta case when the Saulsberry decision was written.
Perhaps the decisions are to be explained as holding merely that the facts
of the Burnetta case did not warrant the conclusion that the "Miners'
Union" had power to act for its membership while in the Sanlsberry case
there was evidence of actual authorization.
96 143 S. W. 1019.
97 143 S. W. at 1020.
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works more accurately when dealing with concrete facts than
it does in a vacuum.
In the Saulsberry case it is clear that the union is given a real
part in the cast.98 The relation existing between the individual
members and the union officials is not that of principal and
agent.99 The principal-agent relation exists rather between the
individual members and the union, as a result of which fact the
agency power tends to take on an irrevocable character so far as
any single union member is concerned. 10 0 The agency relation
is brought about, not by the direct delegation of authority to
a real person, but rather by the subordination of the wills of indi-
viduals to a "collective will" functioning through the principle
of "majority rule." Hence, "if the union [has] a right (power?)
to contract * * * then the desire of the individual members
cannot be taken into consideration at all, and it is immaterial
whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied."
Thus it is clear that through association and the operation of
"majority rule" an artificial personality has been created. It
does not follow, of course, that this personality has the power to
enter into contracts on its own behalf. Persons otherwise incom-
petent may have capacity to act as agents.' 0 Similarly, it may
be noticed that the equitable device of representative actions, 10 2
the numerous statutes which provide for special procedure
against unincorporated associations, 0 3 and even the laws which
98 Compare this case with Meltzer v. Kaminer (Sp. 1927), 227 N. Y.
Supp. 459. Although scanty facts are included in the report, it seems
clear that the Meltzer decision illustrates a similar judicial treatment of
the relation between the union and its members. See particularly p. 461.
99 Though the union officials might, of course, be agents of individual
members.
100 Mark that this is not because agency power has become "coupled
with an interest" as is true in some cases. In some of the union agency
cases, however, the union may actually have rights also. See Mechem,
Agency (2nd Edition Callaghan 1914), Vol. I, fig. 570.
10, See Ibid. Vol. 1, fig. 154.
102 See 32 Yale Law Jour. 59. Federal Equity Rule 38, see 226 U. S.
659.903 New York statute permits suit by or against union in name of presi-
dent or treasurer. Cahills Consolidated Laws (1923), Ch. 20, Art. 3,
Fig. 12. Maine, similarly, Rev. St. (1916), Ch. 87, Sec. 29, p. 1225. In
Conn. and Mich. association may be sued in association name. See Conn.
Gen. Sts. (1918), Vol. 2, Ch. 293, Sec. 5611; Mich. P. Acts (1897), Art.
25, Fig. 1.
Cf. E. E. Witte, Government Labor Disputes (McGraw Hill Book Co.
1931), pp. 142 ff.; also Warren op. cit. pp. 542 ff.
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allow for incorporation of unions,10 4 do not any of them neces-
sarily imply contractual capacity.
A search for evidence of judicial willingness to recognize in-
terests in trade agreements as accruing to the labor union per se,
meets with its initial success in the New York state cases.
Although not by any means inevitable, this perhaps represents
a natural development from previous evolution. New York, as
early as 1851, by statute, adopted procedure for suits by or
against unincorporated unions in the name of president or treas-
urer, and very early permitted incorporation under the Member-
ship Corporation Law. Even though not followed in modern
cases, its courts appear to be among the first to apply the third
party beneficiary theory, and have on several occasions recog-
nized union capacity to act as a legal agent for its members.
Moreover, even before the Federal Supreme Court had placed
its approval on the rule of union responsibility in the Coronado
case, New York had clearly enunciated the doctrine. 0 5
Against this background appears the case of Goldman v.
Cohen,106 bringing with it what seems to be the first clear recog-
nition of an interest in a trade agreement vested in a union
acting as a principal party. In spite of the fact that this case
is frequently treated as parallel with Schlesinger v. Quinto, it is
104 "* * * nothing * * * in any of the laws relating to stock corpora-
tions provides for the actual business of trade unions in contracting with
employers as agents of the employees. This primary object of trade unions
finds no recognition of course, in the non-stock corporation laws, although
the unions that have incorporated in New York have done so under the
Membership Corporation Law, which applies to benevolent, charitable,
scientific and missionary societies." (New York State Dept. of Labor,
1914), Annual Report of Commissioner, Part VII, p. 279.
Recall that in Gulla v. Barton the local and international unions involved
were incorporated in New York and Ohio respectively. In light of the
quotation above, it seems doubtful whether the local union had acquired
competency by incorporating in New York, although perhaps the language
of the Ohio law, which permitted incorporation of mechanics' associations
formed for "mutual protection" was .sufficiently broad to grant legal capa-
city to contract. See Twenty-Second Annual Report of Commissioner of
Labor (Washington, 1907), p. 986.
105 See supra, p. 38, note 88. Note also that in 1922 a Supreme Court
of New York County used the following language, "To identify the union
with the acts of others, clear and convincing evidence is required. A labor
union is a legal entity. Between it and its members there is a distinction
as well defined as that existing between the individual members of the
union." Segenfeld v. Friedman, 193 N. Y. Supp. 128.
106 (App. Div. 1928) 227 N. Y. Supp. 311.
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clear that the Goldman case stands on other ground. In it the
plaintiff was an official of the International Pocket Book Work-
ers Union, who requested an injunction against an employer who
had threatened breach of a union working agreement. The case
as reported was on the employer's appeal from an order which
granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction, and
from an order which had granted a motion to resettle. Although
the order as resettled was held to go beyond the sphere justified
by the terms of the agreement, nevertheless, the appeal court
clearly recognized the plaintiff's right to injunctive relief.
Whether the union may collect damages on behalf of individ-
ual employees it is not necessary to decide . . . it is certain
that the union has more at stake . . . than the sum of the
damages occasioned by the unlawful discharge of all the mem-
bers of the union . . ."107
Here is language without precedent.108 Before this no court had
recognized such rights as accruing under a trade agreement to
an unincorporated union. But Goldman v. Cohen has not been
without its lineal descendants' 0 9 even in other jurisdictions,
although they have not been numerous.
107 Ibid. at 314.
os The court cites Reynolds v. Davis (Mass. 1908), 84 N. E. 457; Fol-
som v. Lewis (Mass. 1911), 94 N. E. 316; Nat'1 Protective Ass'n v. Cum-
mings, 65 N. Y. Supp. 946, affirmed (1902) 63 N. E. 369; and Schlesinger v.
Quinto. Of all these citations that of Schlesinger v. Quinto is the most
appropriate, but even this case is not strictly in point. See supra, pp. 28 ff.
109 Engelking v. Independent Wet Wash Co., Inc., may be nothing more
than a repetition of Schlesinger v. Quinto, but it resembles the Goldman
case in some respects. (Unreported, Sup. Ct. 1931), 13 Law and Labor
224; Weintraub v. Spilke (1931), 255 N. Y. Supp. 50. Here, even internal
reorganization of the union was held not to influence employers' obligations
under the trade agreement. In Moran v. Lasette (1927), 223 N. Y. Supp.
283, it was suggested that a union might have an injunction against a
lockout where it was in violation of a working agreement though it could
not obtain one in this case because of previous breach. Lundoff-Bicknell
Co. v. Smith (Ohio App. 1927), 156 N. E. 243, may appear to deny a similar
remedy to an employer, but here the injunction was really denied because
a sympathetic strike had not been authorized by the union.
But in Preble v. Architectural Iron Workers (1931), 260 Ill. App. 435,
an injunction against a strike in direct violation of agreement was sus-
tained, saying, "We think that the contract (trade agreement) entered into
between the complainant and the Iron League of Chicago, and the defend-
ant union is a valid contract." p. 440. (Note the union was incorporated.)
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Two recent cases from widely separated jurisdictions merit
detailed attention. Chinese American Restaurant Inc. v. Fini-
gan 110 was decided on appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in 1930. The plaintiff, a restaurant proprietor,
brought a bill in equity to restrain the officers of an unincor-
porated musicians' union with which the plaintiff had a trade
agreement, from interfering with the employment relations of
the musicians hired under this agreement. After sustaining a
demurrer to the original bill, the trial judge gave permission to
file an amended bill. The "amended and alternative" bill alleged
a separate oral contract between the plaintiff and the musicians
employed by him, and in a second hearing the lower court stated
that, ". . . if it stood alone, . . . the alternative bill would not
be open to demurrer, but treated as an alternative ground for
relief, it appears to be inconsistent with the allegations in the
amended original bill in that it ignores the contract with the
union pleaded in the original bill."11 Accordingly the bill was
dismissed, and upon appeal this final decree was affirmed.
It seems that by the trade agreement in this case, effective to
June 1, 1930, "the association (musicians union) agreed to fur-
nish eight musicians, members of local nine, as their agent, at
the restaurant for a stipulated weekly price." On October 19,
1929, the officers of the union notified Bittel, the orchestra leader,
whose orchestra had been playing at the plaintiff's restaurant,
that in accordance with a policy adopted by the union, he was to
be transferred to another location. The plaintiffs alleged that
The decision of this case was not availing to the writer when the manu-
script for Collective Bargaining in Chicago was undergoing its final
revision. Hence, then the exact form of the injunction was not clear. It
is certain, however, that circumstances surrounding the case included a
wage dispute which was not in violation of the agreement and to which the
court decision does not refer. See Christenson, op. cit. p. 51 ff.
A case in which a union was granted an injunction against third parties
who were interfering with relations with employing contractors is Carpen-
ters Union v. Citizens Committee (1928), 333 Ill. 225.
A case in which a discrete union interest in a trade agreement was sus-
tained on what appears to have been very inadequate attention to the par-
ticular facts, and where the court assumes without discussion that the New
York cases were parallel is Weber v. Nasser (Cal. 1930), 286 Pac. 1074,
but the question as to enforceability had become moot upon appeal, so that
the supreme court failed to pass on the decision, (1930) 292 Pac. 637. See
also Ribner v. Racso Butter & Egg Co. (1929), 238 N. Y. Supp. 132.
110 (Mass. 1930) 172 N. E. 510.
M1 172 N. E. 511.
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this order was not only an effort to bring about a breach of a
personal oral agreement with Bittel that he would continue in
his employment with the plaintiff until June 1, 1930, but also
that the order was a direct violation of the trade agreement itself.
A fair interpretation of this case must emphasize the fact
that the plaintiff did not contest the existence of a valid contract
in the trade agreement. While admitting the fact of the trade
agreement, he sought rather to enforce a personal oral agree-
ment, which the court held to be an inconsistent position upon a
proper interpretation of the union agreement. Nevertheless, for
present purposes the case is significant because the court does
recognize that a union per se may acquire rights and duties
under a trade agreement.1 12
A stronger case'1 3 illustrating union interest comes from the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals. The action was brought by an
unincorporated union which asked for an injunction to restrain
breach of a closed shop rule in its agreement with the defendant
employer. From an order granting the injunction the employer
appealed, but without success.
In a lengthy opinion, which fortunately embodies a detailed
statement of facts although it evidences an uncritical reading of
the legal literature, the court not only sustained the plea for re-
lief, but actually went out of its way to make clear that its
decision was based upon a recognition of a union interest. The
ingenious brief for the union had made it clear that the plain-
tiff's plea did not rest upon the claim that the union per se had
a legal interest in the agreement. Rather it was argued that
the union represented the individual members and it was alleged,
That under the contract (sic) . . . the defendants bound and
obligated themselves to employ their electricians from among the
membership of the said Local Union . . .; that no specific num-
ber of employees were named who were to be so employed, nor
the length of time they were to be retained . . . and that there-
fore, these plaintiffs come and say that the damages sustained
by them and each of them cannot be measured by any pecuniary
standard known to the law." 4
In spite of this pleading, the court states:
112 "With this contract in force the association violated no duty it owed
to the plaintiff * * * but was exercising rights acquired by its contract
• * *" 172 N. E. at 512.
113 Harper v. Local 520 (Tex. 1932), 48 S. W. (2nd) 1033.
114 Tbid at 1039-40.
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We are not concerned here with the agreement from the view-
point of the legal rights inuring thereunder to the individual
members of the union; . . . (here the court cites 44 Har. Law
Rev. 572).
Aside from those aspects of the agreement which give rise to
legal rights in favor of the individual members of the union as
such . . . the collective agreement is now treated in a number
of jurisdictions as a contract also between the organization or
group as such and the employer.' 1 5
Although the specific defenses were on other grounds," 6 and
although the plaintiff's argument did not rest upon the conten-
tion of union competency, it is clear that the decision of the court
is based squarely upon the assumption that the union per se is a
distinct personality which has somehow acquired the power to
make contracts. The opinion will be searched in vain, however,
for an explanation of how this capacity was created.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
In spite of some clear inconsistencies in the decisions, as well
as of doubts which must exist regarding their interpretation,
certain conclusions emerge from this discussion. The first is
that, on occasions courts have recognized rights arising out of
the trade agreement in favor of the union as a personality, as
well as for the benefit of individual employees.
In the cases involving individual interests under union agree-
ments, three lines of reasoning have found clear expression, but
these are not necessarily in conflict. It may be that they repre-
sent not essentially different rules of law, but that each one is
applicable to different sets of facts.
In the first group of cases reviewed, which seem to represent
by far the most common circumstances where litigation has in-
volved the trade union agreement, all that may be concluded with
certainty is that the terms of the union agreement will define the
workers' rights where there is a fair basis upon which to pre-
sume that they were adopted as a part of the contract of em-
115 Ibid at 1037.
116 The defense argument was based upon 1, absence of consideration;
2, inappropriateness of injunctive relief; 3, public policy. If the oppor-
tunity presents itself the writer proposes, at a later time, to undertake an
intensive analysis of the treatment of all three of these matters in the cases
involving trade union agreements.
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ployment. Unless there is evidence of actual agency or unless
the union itself is regarded as competent, only two or possibly
three cases, justify even a suspicion that the courts will go be-
yond this point and recognize individual workers' interests
where there is no evidence that the agreement has been incor-
porated into the employment contract. Whether or not these
doubtful cases constitute the first step in the evolution of a legal
rule which will permit suits on the trade agreement by or against
union members who enter into employment in union shops, with-
out further evidence of the adoption of the terms of the agree-
ment, is as yet premature.
Application of the third party beneficiary interpretation of
workers' rights first appeared in New York in a case involving
the agreement of an incorporated union, but no subsequent case
has been found where the courts of that state have continued this
precedent. All the third party beneficiary cases from other jur-
isdictions appear to have been concerned with agreements of un-
incorporated unions. These cases necessarily imply that the
union, although not incorporated, has somehow acquired com-
petency. Where unions are incorporated, there still might be
some question as to whether corporate charters grant the power
to make the particular type of contracts which would grow out
of the trade agreements. In spite of these questions, at least two
courts of last resort have clearly approved of supporting claims
of individual workmen to rights under trade agreements, on third
party beneficiary reasoning. The fact that the same conclusion
might have been reached in both of these cases on other grounds,
however, tends to rob the decisions of some of their meaning, in
spite of the high authority from which they come.
New York again leads the way in the use of agency principles
to sustain workers' interests. The cases thus far decided, how-
ever, appear to have considered agreements which were espe-
cially designed to be enforced by law; they do not therefore
warrant the conclusion that even the New York courts will en-
force union workers' interests in any union agreement on agency
principles.
The courts of the Empire State also appear to have initiated
the movement, if it may be spoken of as a movement at this early
date, to recognize a corporate union interest in addition to what-
ever rights may accrue to individual workmen. Although not
many decisions have involved the point, New York courts have
clearly and unmistakably shown a tendency to recognize con-
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tractual rights arising out of trade agreements, even in unincor-
porated unions. Whether this tendency may be regarded as in-
dicating a permanent rule, and whether it may be expected to
spread to other jurisdictions is still uncertain. A few cases have
been found which indicate a willingness of other jurisdictions to
follow the New York lead.
If this summary seems to leave many matters still unsettled,
the only defense offered is that it is as complete as the decisions
justify. The position here taken is that nothing is gained for
the present by attempting to express more definite rules than can
be found in the actual language of the courts. One conviction
appears to emerge clearly from a study of the judicial opinions.
It is that much of what appears to be conflict in the legal rules
results from the fact that trade union agreements and trade
union practices vary widely. Many of the judicial errors are
probably produced by that familiar desire, not confined to the
bench alone, to generalize more widely than facts permit.
